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Abstract
Despite the fact that banks in Central Europe are burdened by extraordinarily high bad loan ratios,
the recent financial crisis in South East Asia and Russia, has not led to a massive failure of banks
in the region. In this paper, we study economic trends and policies that may have helped to
insulate CEECs from international financial contagion. Answering what went right over the past
few years may not only help to further positive developments, but it may also highlight possible
weaknesses that could result in future financial instabilities in the banking sectors of CEECs.
Using data available from the IMF, and the BIS for nine Central European economies (Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia),
our results indicate that an economic constellation unique to the early transition period rather than
deliberate policy decisions have stabilized the CEECs. Specifically, the lack of recent banking
crisis can be attributed to a lack of overly optimistic credit expansion, despite several years of real
economic growth, to underdeveloped asset markets, and to a decline of trade relations with the
former Soviet Union. Future problems may arise as banks are beginning to extend credit more to
an expanding real sector than in the past, as asset markets become more developed, or as export
growth to the EU may decline with European growth slowing down. Thus, improvements in bank
regulation and bank supervision should receive a high priority among policy makers in CEECs.
Keywords: transition economies, emerging economies, banking crises, monetary policy, exchange
rate policy, bank regulation, bank supervision
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I. Introduction
The banking systems of the transition economies have compiled bad loan ratios in the
double digits during the early transition years. However, in the wake of the financial crisis in
South East Asia and Russia, the transition banking systems have not experienced bank runs or
massive bank failures. What is it that has saved these economies from the fate of other emerging
economies in the wake of the Mexican and South East Asian crises?
Banking systems play a central role in any economy, hence their failure would have serious
repercussions. Stable financial systems can channel savings to investors, and thus permit
productive capacities to improve. Financial crises, then, not only constitute the breakdown of an
industry, but they also adversely affect domestic output through a credit contraction.
The risk of a banking crisis occurring is intrinsically linked to the risks banks are exposed
to, and the chance that these risks materialize. Through financial liberalization, banks are generally
exposed to greater default, exchange rate, interest rate, and maturity risks. More importantly,
though, the experience in other emerging economies has shown that the likelihood that these risks
will materialize also grows with financial liberalization.
Understanding the stability of the early transition economies is not only of interest to the
economies themselves, but also to their EU neighbours. Banking crises in Central Europe seem
to hit closer to home than financial turmoil in South East Asia as many investors learned after the
Russian crisis. Hence, it is important to identify the factors which helped to stabilize banks of the
earlier transition economies to ensure that slower transition economies will also become or remain
stable, and second, to correct possible shortcomings which could lead to instabilities in the future.
Obviously, something must have gone right if Central European banks, which are exposed
to greater risks, did not experience bank runs and failures. This stability may result from a unique
constellation of economic fundamentals. It may also result from the speed at which financial
systems were transformed. The rapid transition may have made the creation of stabilizing
institutions possible within a short time frame. Thus, emerging economies that have liberalized at
a slower pace than transition economies may be haunted by ”non-market inertia”. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II .1  provides an overview
of the economic and institutional trends in transition economies, so far as they pertain to their
banking stability. In section II .2, a univariate comparison of the data for transition economies and
other emerging economies is presented, while a few concluding remarks follow in section III.
II.  Risks and Protection in Transition Economies
II. 1   Banking Crisis after Financial Liberalization
Before we pursue our empirical analysis it seems useful to give a few definitions, and a
framework to study the chance of banking crises in Central and Eastern Europe countries
(CEECs). We begin with brief definitions of banking crises, and financial liberalization (FL), and
then lay out a framework which connects FL to the likelihood of banking crises. 2
An indication for a looming banking crisis may be a deterioration of the balance sheets of
commercial banks, which could precede a bank run. Massive bank failures, or public intervention
in a large share of the banking system subsequently end a bank run. Increased bad loan ratios do
not necessarily have to lead to banking crises if they can be fended off through the use of the
banks’ own reserves or through bail-out programs. In this case, the chance of a banking crisis
increases without resulting in bank runs, and bank failures. In this paper, we are chiefly interested
in the occurrence, or more accurately non-occurrence, of bank runs, as signs of banking crises.
In a number of previous studies the likelihood of banking crisis has been connected to an
economy’s previous liberalization of its financial sector. The radical financial market changes,
which have occurred in CEECs over the past decade, including bank privatization, entry of foreign
banks, creation of market based lending rules, or elimination of interest rate ceilings, by and large
meet the definition of financial liberalization (FL). FL is understood as the elimination of financial
regulations in the domestic financial markets to reduce excess demand for credit (McKinnon,
1973; Shaw, 1973). In addition to reducing domestic restrictions, FL often comprises external
liberalization leading to the permission of overseas lending and borrowing and a greater mobility
of multinational corporations (MNCs) and multinational banks (MNBs). 
Since FL has been the prominent policy stance in CEECs, our attention now focuses on
the possible link between liberalization and crisis. Generally speaking, financial liberalization (FL),
exposes banks to a number of risks, which are also more likely to materialize after liberalization.
Clearly, saying that risks increase if banks borrow more or lend out more is tautological. The
important aspect, then, is that these risks become more likely to materialize after FL.
Banking instabilities could arise after FL due to an initial “deregulation euphoria”. This
may sound like pure psychology, but it can be relatively easily connected to economic
fundamentals. As domestic financial markets become more liberalized, credit may be expanded
to sectors that were previously credit constrained, mainly because rising real interest rates promise
more profits to credit suppliers. Greater supply of credit might in turn increase business
investment, thus possibly leading to an output increase (Calvo and Corricelli, 1993; Weller, 1999)
- as long as borrowers are willing to borrow at higher real interest rates. Borrowers may be
inclined to borrow at higher real rates either because they expect lower interest rates in the future,
or because the risk of bankruptcy for each firm declines if enough firms borrow at unsustainably
high interest rates. With higher real rates and with expanding real and financial sectors, more
funds should be attracted from overseas. More capital inflows from abroad, in turn, may lead to
a currency appreciation in real terms, hence attracting even more international capital. In other
words, initially a previously financially repressed economy should see real gains from FL. 
However, rather than a stable equilibrium, changes in economic fundamentals after
liberalization may merely produce periods of tranquility (Minsky, 1986). Mainly because the
continued overvaluation of a currency helps to attract foreign capital, governments may find
themselves in a situation where they maintain an overvalued real exchange rate to bring in new
capital despite the fact that it hurts its export producing sector. Put differently, while the real
sector is already experiencing a slow down, as often reflected in a worsening current account
balance and lower industrial production growth, international and domestic lenders may still
expand credit. While the size and growth rates of this speculative financing can vary with the3
strength of the regulatory structures, the outcome is still a more unstable banking structure. A
banking crisis may then result from an unsustainable, speculative credit expansion.
Because of its domestic and international features, FL exposes domestic banks to a
number of risks over time, namely default risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk and maturity
risk. Further, as FL may create a destabilizing dynamic, banks’ exposure to these risks may not
only rise, but the likelihood that these risks may materialize may also increase. 
First, default risk, that is the risk that borrowers are going to default on their loans,
becomes larger simply because more credit is extended, usually at higher interest rates. As the
quality of borrowers may gradually deteriorate if banks engage in speculative financing, the
default risk rises further. Borrower default may also increase because the real sector is adversely
affected by FL. For instance, the terms of trade worsen with a currency overvaluation, making
exports a harder sell. Or, an appreciating currency following FL may provide an incentive to
domestic borrowers to take out foreign currency loans, and thus raise the likelihood of default in
the case of a devaluation. Finally, before a devaluation becomes necessary, monetary authorities
may be tempted to tighten their stance on money to avoid capital outflows, thereby inducing a real
economic slow down. 
Second, banks may be exposed to a greater exchange rate risk if banks borrow overseas
or if they lend out foreign currency loans. Exchange rate risk is the risk that a domestic currency
will be devalued, thus making the repayment of foreign currency denominated loans harder. Since
FL may have an initially appreciating effect on a currency as more capital is attracted into an
economy, domestic banks may be enticed to finance domestic assets with foreign liabilities (BIS,
1997; Grabel, 1998). If emerging market currencies become overvalued, more speculative
investments may attract more international capital inflows with the promise of short-term gains
(Dornbusch, Goldfaijn and Valdés, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). To avoid large-scale
capital outflows, monetary authorities may try to maintain the overvaluation with possibly
insufficient reserves or with a tightened monetary stance. A devaluation may ultimately become
unavoidable as reserves are depleted or the economic performance begins to slow down.
Third, FL may lead to a growing maturity risk. Maturity risk is understood here as the risk
that enough short-term bank liabilities, which have been used to fund long-term assets, are
withdrawn to force banks to recall their long-term outstanding assets. Short-term international
loans may be withdrawn if international investors anticipate economic difficulties. As a large share
of overseas funds are in the form of short-term loans, quick recall is rather easy. Large scale
short-term capital inflows may have helped to generate initially an overvaluation, which may make
a devaluation, and subsequent capital outflows more likely.
Fourth, with capital account liberalization as part of FL interest rate risk increases, too.
Interest rate risk is the possibility that outside interest rates rise, and hence capital flows out of
an economy. If banks borrow short-term funds on international financial markets, investors can
withdraw their funds rather quickly if the differential between international capital market rates
and the domestic market rates are narrowing. Similarly, domestic investors are not insensitive to
changes in interest rate differential, and they will subsequently move their financial investments
wherever higher risk adjusted yields can be earned. Notice that both domestic and international
borrowers may perceive investments in emerging economies as riskier if economic fundamentals4
begin to deteriorate, for which they may be compensated by a widening interest rate differential
due to monetary tightening. However, as tight money may stifle economic growth, a future
narrowing of the interest rate differential, and capital outflows may become more likely. 
Moving from macro factors to the micro workings of financial markets, the risks banks
incur may decline due to more international financial competition. It is likely that banks in
transition economies reduce their loan and risk exposure once they find themselves in competition
with well capitalised MNBs. In other words, if a bank’s net worth is above its safety threshold for
prudent lending, more international competition may lead a bank to reduce its lending, such that
it can lower its loan and risk exposure – assuming that its capital base is weaker than its
competitor’s and that access to new capital is limited (Weller 1998a, 1998b). The reduction in
lending will be greater if MNBs engage in ”cherry picking” leaving only borrowers of lesser
quality for domestic banks. Obviously, the more a bank reduces its lending the less likely it is to
experience default risks, or maturity risks, and thus bank runs. 
Adding to the greater problems for banks after FL is the likelihood that, as banking
systems are becoming more vulnerable to crises, the support governments can provide is
declining, too. The need to support a domestic financial system may come in the wake of already
deteriorating economic fundamentals before a crisis, sometimes induced by government policies,
such as tightened money (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). In other words, at the same time that
government finances are worsening the demands on these finances may be rising.
II.2  Reducing the Risks in Central Europe
As mentioned earlier, the stability of banks in the transition economies may be the
outcome of effective policies, or it may be the result of economic fundamentals unique to these
transition economies. Essentially, to mitigate the risks banks are exposed to policy makers could
either reduce banks’ exposure to these risks, or they could try to reduce the probability that these
risks materialize. While policies may have helped to stabilize banks in transition economies, their
stability may also be simply the result of economic fundamentals, which may have, despite greater
openness and more deregulation, led to a reduction in the banks’ exposure to risks.
We could think of a number of policies, which may have led to a reduction in the risks for
banks after FL. Such policies could generally include: exchange rate policies which would lower
the exchange rate risk, tight monetary policy which should address worries about exchange rate
risk, interest rate risk, capital controls which would also reduce the exposure to exchange rate
risk, maturity risk, interest rate risk, and adequate supervision and regulation which should reduce
default risk. Furthermore, the transition economies in Central Europe have also inherited large
state holdings of private enterprises and banks. Thus, they are in the unique position to possibly
raise additional funds through privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and to potentially stabilize
their banks through more competition via joint ventures or majority share holdings by MNBs.
Monetary policy remains largely focused on price and exchange rate stability for most of
the period, thereby accepting adverse output and employment effects (Abel, Siklos, and Szekely,
1998; Hoen, 1998; Mygind, 1997; Rybczynksi, 1997; Skreb, 1997; Norgard, 1996; Bruno, 1993;1
  In the case of currency boards in Estonia and Lithuania, the causality runs the other way. Here
fixed exchange rate regimes are introduced to curtail domestic inflation.  
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Calvo and Corricelli, 1992). Tight monetary policy has been implemented early to curtail high
inflation in the wake of price liberalizations (OECD, 1997; Banerjee et al., 1995), and to help the
credibility of newly established currencies
1. Particularly, in the now independent states of the
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as in the separated Czech and Slovak Republic,
monetary credibility was inherently tied to the stability of newly created currencies.
Table 1 illustrates both the initial rationale for and the effect of tight monetary policies
across the region. Early in the transition process, that is between 1990 and 1993, inflation rates
have been high and accelerating due to price liberalizations, and due to a general uncertainty about
each economy’s future. A firm stance on money, particularly in 1992 with an average interest rate
of 331%, has lowered inflation in the following years. After an initial increase in both M1 and M2
relative to GDP, both decline after 1992 until 1995, and M1 even until 1996.Once inflation rates
have become more stable, monetary policies have become less restrictive in 1997, as M1 and M2
grow quite rapidly. Clearly, the change in monetary policy has been too recent to assess its impact
on bank stability. However, just like a tightening of monetary policy may lead to a rise in the
default risk due to higher capital costs, a loosening of monetary policy may help to continue the
recovery in CEECs, and thus lower the default risk. 
Tight monetary policies in Eastern Europe were intended to not only stabilize prices, but
also to establish credibility for the newly created currencies. However, currency stability may
result either from limited convertibility or from fixed exchange rate regimes. In either case,
exchange rate risk should become lower. Table 2 provides an overview of changes introduced to
the exchange rate regimes and controls in a number of CEECs. Two trends seem noteworthy,
namely throughout the period most economies are loosening their exchange rate restrictions, and
the viability of fixed exchange rates, or crawling pegs seems to be only gradually emerging. While
Hungary, Poland, and to a lesser degree, the Czech Republic seem to have stabilized their
exchange rates, the Slovak Republic seems to be struggling. Exchange rate risk may be currently
curtailed in most economies as pegged exchange rates remain stable. However, future instabilities
may lurk if pegged exchange rates become harder to maintain in a more open environment.
Tight money may have led to an initial economic downturn, thus raising borrower default,
but it may have lowered interest rate and exchange rate risks by rising real interest rates, and
stabilizing exchange rates. Whether both stable prices and exchange rates can be maintained
depends on the credibility of monetary policies now that money is expanding again, and it depends
on future exchange rate changes in a more open environment. Hence, while exchange rate and
interest rate risk have been contained in the recent past - in a trade-off against a rising default risk
- these risks may rise again  in a more deregulated environment with less tight money.
 Capital controls may help to reduce exchange rate, maturity and interest rate risks. While
some of the transition economies have initially introduced some inward and outward capital
controls (Abel, Siklos, Szekely, 1998; Druzic, 1997; Leinela and Sutela, 1997; Mygind, 1997;
Radosevic and Dyker, 1997; CNB, 1995), these have largely been lifted (table 3). Remaining
capital controls may come in the form of limitations on the ability of residents to move capital2
 Bank recapitalizations are not always driven by economic reasoning alone. For instance,
recapitalization of the Bank for Food Economy, BGZ, in Poland, was arguably only possible in
the political climate at the time, when the Polish Peasant Party provided the prime minister.
3 More competition may lower the rent seeking by domestic banks, thus making them by
definition more efficient, but also limiting their ability to acquire new technologies or staff. Thus,
reducing their lending engagements seems to be the only alternative to reduce their default risks.
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abroad (Radosevic, 1997; BOS, 1998), or as requirements to obtain foreign exchange licenses
(NBS, 1995). Thus, capital account regulations have made it easier over time to invest and
withdraw funds, consequently raising exchange rate, maturity and interest rate risks. The fact that
the elimination of capital controls is a rather recent phenomenon, in most economies after 1996,
may explain why these risks have not materialized yet. 
Whereas all risks seem to be increasing in recent years, bank instabilities could be curtailed
through improvements in bank regulation and supervision. Recently, however, a number of
remaining problems in the supervision and regulation of banks in transition economies have been
identified (Bonin, Mizsei, Szekely, and Wachtel, 1998). Among them are moral hazard problems
due to relatively big state-ownership of large banks, necessary recapitalizations of domestic banks,
the lagging application of international accounting standards, and the prohibition of orderly exit
of domestic banks. Overall, it seems that ”the infrastructure for bank supervision and regulation
has not developed as quickly as it should”(Bonin et al, 1998:1).
The need for adequate supervision and regulation clearly emerges in CEECs from their
persistently high bad loan ratios, and the continued recapitalization efforts of large domestic
banks. Especially in the large economies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have wholly
or partially state owned banks been repeatedly been the target of government fund injections
2.
Obviously, most of these measures are necessitated by the persistence of bad loan ratios, but the
issue remains as to whether repeated recapitalizations create moral hazard problems for the
domestic banking sector. To avoid instabilities from riskier lending among banks, bank regulation
and supervision need to be effective. 
Finally, bank stability may have been achieved through increased international competition
It needs to be noted, though, that domestic banks are not necessarily becoming more efficient, but
that they simply lend less as they desire to lower their risk exposure, while competing with well
capitalized MNBs
3. In all transition economies, MNB entry has been introduced as a mainstay of
economic reform. Hungary, for instance, promoted foreign ownership of domestic banks most
forcefully (Anderson and Kegels, 1998). By 1994, about 15.1% of all Hungarian banks were
already foreign-owned, with a further increase to 35.6% in 1995, and expected increase to 47%
in 1996 (Abel, Siklos and Szekely, 1998). Hungary has also seen a consistent decline of real credit
as a result of increased competition, as has Poland (Weller, 1998a, 1998b). Clearly, if banks lend
less commercially, they automatically lower their default risk.
With respect to the policies discussed here that may have helped to stabilize the banking
systems in CEECs two aspects seem to be worth emphasizing. First, tight monetary policies and
increased international financial competition may have helped to stabilize the banking system at7
the expense of real sector development. Second, changes in monetary policies, or in policies
pertaining to exchange rate and capital controls may have happened too recently to destabilize
domestic banks during the recent Russian turmoil, but they may bear the seeds for future troubles.
Further, countervening forces, such as adequate regulation and supervision, are still in their
developing stages. 
Besides  new policies, there is also the possibility that economic fundamentals may change
in the future, thus raising the risks for domestic banks. In other words, banking sectors in
transition economies have so far been stable thanks to a constellation of economic fundamentals
unique to the early transition period, in addition to active policies pursued.
The real sector, for instance, shows signs of recovery, whereas there remain hints of
weakness (table 4). Thus, the default risk may have gradually declined, while dangers of future
increases are still looming. GDP per capita (on a PPP basis) shows initially a sharp decline,
followed by a gradual increase, such that it reached its nominal 1990 level for the first time again
in 1997. As a result of the economic deterioration, governmental balances are initially worsening,
before improving slowly. Further, GDP and industrial production both decrease for three years
before they begin growing again in 1994. Hence, unemployment grows quickly to between 10%
and 12% for most of the period, whereas wages of those who are still employed fall initially and
then rise gradually. While economic growth seems on a sound footing in the late 1990's, it is
important to note that it followed a sharp drop, and that severe problems, such as high
unemployment, remain. .
With the real economy slowly recovering, the focus shifts to the financial sector, where
some trends may have helped to lower the default, and maturity risks (table 1). Especially,
inflation has decreased to manageable levels after high and sometimes hyper-inflation in the early
years. Clearly, price stability has a stabilizing impact as international investors become more likely
to undertake more long-term projects, thus automatically reducing the maturity risk. Similarly,
increased price stability for sustained periods of time allows monetary authorities to ease their
monetary stance, thus making it easier for borrowers to finance desired investments. 
While businesses want to invest, banks appear hesitant to lend (Anderson and Kegels,
1998; Abel, Szekely and Siklos, 1998; Weller, 1999a, 1999b; Mygind, 1997; Dittus, 1994), as
table 1 already indicates. While slow credit expansion may have real adverse effects (Weller,
1999c; Calvo and Corricelli, 1992, 1993), it may also lower the default risk for banks – which may
be the rationale for less credit exposure in the first place. However, it is quite likely that as banks
lower their net default ratios lending increases over time - as seems to be generally the case in
1997 - thereby raising again the default risk to banks. 
Finally, as the CEECs have become more integrated into the world economy, the risk of
contagion effects, and thus the probability of banking crises is also growing (table 5). Even a
sound economy may be affected by contagion effects. A deterioration in the trade balance as a
result of contagion spells economic troubles for exporters, and potentially for import competing
industries, thus raising the default risk. Also, under fixed exchange rate regimes, a deterioration
of the trade balance should make a devaluation more likely, suggesting a greater exchange rate
risk . Clearly, trade ties with the former Soviet Union could pose a threat of contagion for
transition economies. Overall, exports and imports have grown, while the current account8
balances of almost all transition economies have lately turned negative - making them more
vulnerable if contagion poses a problem. However, exports to and imports from the Russian
Federation ranged from negligible in Slovenia and Croatia (2.9% of exports and 2.7% of imports)
to a substantial 24.5% of exports and 25.3% of imports in Lithuania by 1997 (ECE, 1998).
Generally, the large economies export 3%-7% of their exports to the Russian Federation, and
import 7%-9% of their imports from there. In other words, while contagion seems less of a
concern to the former Yugoslavia or the Visegrad countries, they may pose a problem for the
Baltic economies. 
Similar to trade related contagion, contagion effects may also spread through international
financial markets. If international financial investors get burned in one emerging economy, they
are likely to repatriate their funds to safer grounds from other economies, too. For example,
investors withdrew funds from a number of economies in the wake of the Mexican peso crises in
1995, even though some of them had very little obvious connections with Mexico, which is, for
instance, reflected in the stock market decline in 1995 (table 4). How vulnerable transition
economies are to international capital mobility depends largely on their exposure to short-term
funds. Overall, transition economies seem to have maintained stable levels of external debt, while
there seems to be a shift from short-term debt to more long-term debt. Thus, international
investors become more likely to invest more long-term in the CEECs over time, which is also
reflected in the continuous flows of FDI and more MNB lending. More long-term financial
commitments consequently spell less maturity, interest rate and exchange rate risks. 
More long-term international investments may also help to reduce the chance for
speculative bubbles. In a number of emerging economies, bank crises have been linked to asset
market speculation, which in turn has been fuelled by growing short-term international debt, or
so-called ”hot” money (Weller, 1998d; Grabel, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996; Lindgren,
Garcia and Saal, 1996; Sheng, 1996; Benink and Llewellyn, 1994b; Balino and Sundararajan,
1991). Obviously, as speculative bubbles raise the default risk, the question arises as to why large
scale speculation has not been a problem in the CEECs. Speculative growth, albeit common after
FL in emerging economies, may not have occurred in the CEECs because domestic banks have
been slow to expand their loan portfolios due to their high bad loan burdens, because international
investors have moved into more long-term investments, and because asset markets are
underdeveloped, thereby impeding speculation.
This overview of real, financial and external trends suggests that a constellation of
economic fundamentals unique to the early transition years has helped to insulate the CEECs from
the recent global financial turmoil. In particular, slow credit expansions, a reorientation of trade
towards the EU, and more long-term investment horizons seem among the beneficial factors.
However, for the future either one of these factors may deteriorate as a stabilizing factor. For
instance, a persistent slow down in the EU would have clear repercussions for trade and economic
growth in the region. Also, the elimination of capital controls and the development of asset
markets may make the CEECs more attractive for short-term capital flows in the near future.9
III.  Conclusion and Policy Implications for Croatia
In this paper, we have looked at the question as to why the transition economies in Central
and Eastern Europe have not been caught up in the recent financial turmoil, which has spanned
from South East Asia to Russia to Brazil. In particular, the fact that banks in transition economies
may not failed on a massive scale, or that major bail-out packages, similar to those for Korea or
Indonesia, have not been necessary may be caused either by stabilizing policies, or by a
constellation of economic fundamentals unique to the early transition years. 
Our research finds that a unique constellation of economic fundamentals, rather than
deliberate policies have helped to insulate transition economies. True, a number of policies, such
as exchange rate controls, and, more importantly, capital controls, have contributed to the stability
of the transition banking systems in the early years, but lately most stabilizing policies have been
reversed. Also, policies which are designed to directly stabilize banks, such as the permission to
allow international financial competition, may have adverse real effects, hence increasing the
default risk of domestic borrowers. In other words, policies, which we may associate with
increasing stability of banks, may actually have an ambiguous effect. This leaves us turning to
economic fundamentals looking for clues. Here we find that slow credit growth, a reorientation
of trade towards the EU, and more long-term investment horizons seem among the factors
contributing to banking stability in the CEECs. However, for the future either one of these factors
may deteriorate, and lose its stabilizing impact. For instance, a slow down or recession in the EU
would have clear repercussions for trade and economic growth in the region. Also, the elimination
of capital controls and the development of asset markets may make the CEECs more attractive
for short-term capital flows in the near future, and thus open to speculative growth similar to that
observed in Asia or Latin America.
Concluding that the lack of recent financial turmoil is not necessarily due to economic
policies should not be misunderstood, though. It does not mean that the policies pursued did not
achieve their original goals. It also does not mean that there are no policies that transition
economies could pursue to stabilize their banking systems. Clearly, evaluating each policy with
respect to all goals that it is designed to achieve is beyond the scope of this discussion. Debates
over optimal monetary policies alone could probably fill volumes. Hence, we are going to focus
here only on policies transition economies should consider for the future. 
Adequate regulation and supervision of domestic banks should rank high on the priority
list of policy makers, especially since it appears that more work needs to be done in this area.
Banking systems in open emerging economies are prone to experience crisis as they are exposed
to a number of risks. As international factors in addition to domestic ones are now determining
banking stability, regulators and supervisors are even more demanded than in a purely domestic
setting. The need for improvements in regulation and supervision are augmented by the recent
economic improvements as they are prone to breed optimistic expectations, and hence credit
expansions, even for borrowers of lesser quality. Further, the continued, and necessary,
recapitalizations of large banks in transition economies may begin to create moral hazard
problems, which may become worse without adequate regulation and supervision.
Transition economies have done well with respect to banking crises in part because of a
more long term commitment of international investors. We have argued that this more longer time10
horizon of international investors is to some degree caused by the lack of well developed asset
markets, which would allow for short term portfolios investment inflows. Obviously, this should
not be misunderstood as an argument in favor of not developing capital markets, but rather taken
as an argument to design capital controls in such a way that they lengthen the time horizon of
international investors. Such capital controls could include so-called “speed bumps”, or minimum
stay requirements for international investors. 
Finally, a number of transition economies appear to have been successful in establishing
pegged exchange rates. Thus, domestic currencies have not come under devaluation pressures as
pegged exchange rates in South East Asia, Russia or Latin America have come. With the
elimination of exchange rate and capital controls, the chance for currencies to be exposed to
international financial market pressures to devalue becomes clearly greater. However, while fully
flexible exchange rates cannot come under devaluation pressures, the greater volatility associated
with flexible exchange rates may disrupt international trade flows. Considering that the CEECs
are integrated to a relatively large degree via international trade flows, this last concern should
be taken very seriously. However, even with flexible exchange rates, a certain level of stability can
be achieved through either capital controls designed to curb the volatility of international capital
flows, or through solid monetary and fiscal policies pursuing stable economic growth. 11
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Table 1
Money and Credit
Year M1/GDP M2/GDP Credit/GDP Discount Rate Inflation
1990 24.56 43.51 80.98  34.00 203.33
1991 24.13 46.88 73.39  21.20 119.00
1992 26.88 50.51 68.47 330.90 444.67
1993 21.57 49.00 60.94  28.53 490.99
1994 20.70 47.63 57.61  11.32  29.45
1995 18.24 47.24 50.54  15.41  18.46
1996 17.63 54.33 51.52  11.50  11.86
1997 24.90 68.48 76.37  11.19    9.84
Note: All money and credit figures are GDP weighted averages, whereas discount rates and inflation rates are simple averages. In the case of Estonia,





06/1991 Introduction of Croatian dinar. Foreign exchange rate pegged to a basket of
currencies. 
05/1994 Croatian dinar as national currency replaced by kuna at the ratio of 1 kuna :1000
dinars.   
03/1997 Foreign juridical persons allowed to withdraw monthly foreign currency equivalent up
to HRK 15,000 from deposit accounts
Czech Republic
02/1993 Introduction of the Czech Koruna. The Czech National Bank adjusts the official Koruna
rate by pegging it to a basket consisting of five currencies.                           
05/1993 Reduction of currencies in basket to peg Koruna to from five to DEM and USD. 
01/1994 Maximum allowance for foreign travel raised to 12,000 Koruna per year. 
02/1994 Simplification and partial liberalization of permit procedures for enterprises to keep
foreign currency accounts.                                                                     
03/1994 Adjustment of Koruna exchange rate against clearing ECU from 3% above the market
cross rate to parity.                                                                            
09/1994 Limit to import or export domestic currency increased to 5,000 Koruny.
04/1995 Fee of 0.25% on banks' foreign exchange transactions with National Bank. 
02/1996 Widening of foreign exchange rate band of Koruna fluctuation from 0.5% to 7.5%
against the central rate. 
05/1997 Canceling of foreign exchange rate band; introduction of new exchange arrangement
based on managed floating system to stabilize Koruna against the Deutsche Mark.   
Estonia
06/1992 Currency Board with a fixed exchange rate of 8 Estonian Kroons to 1 DM. 
12/1993 Elimination of requirement that spread between buying and selling rates of foreign
exchange by banks not exceed 7%.                                             
03/1994 individuals permitted to open foreign exchange accounts with domestic banks.Time Changes
17
Hungary
06/1991 Legal markets for currencies which have not ben officially quoted established. The
National Bank of Hungary adjusts the official exchange rate to a basket of currencies
weighted according to currency composition of foreign trade turnover.                     
12/1991 Change of the currency basket to determine Forint's external value from 11 currencies
(weighted according to currency composition of foreign trade turnover) to 50 % ECU -
50% USD. Spot exchange rates now quoted on the basis of international markets'
exchange rates of the same instead of previous business day. Banks allowed to freely set
exchange rates for currency notes and traveler´s checks if  buying rate is not above and
selling rate not below the official middle rate and margins for currency notes are the same
around the commercial banks' middle rate for currency notes.                     
02-09/1993 Exchange rate depreciations in February, March, June, July, September by 1.9% to
4.5%.   
06/1993 Widening of exchange rate margins within which banks allowed to quote interbank and
customers' rates from 0.3% to 0.5%.                                                                          
08/1993 ECU in currency basket for Forint pegging replaced by Deutsche Mark.                  
01-12  /1994 Widening of official spot buying and selling rates‘ margins form +/- 0.3% to +/- 0.5%
(January); to 1.25% (August); 2.25% (December).                                                     
01-12/1994 Exchange rate depreciations in Jan., Feb., May, Jun., Aug., Oct., Nov. by ca. 1.0% -
2.6%.  
04-05/1994 Elimination of several restrictions on currency purchases for tourism and business travel.
 
05/1994 Changing of the currency pegging basket: 50% DEM, 50% USD to 70% ECU, 30%
USD.   
06/1994 Nonresidents allowed to convert forints from foreign trade into foreign exchange.   
03/1995 Devaluation of the exchange rate by 8.3 %; adjustment of the exchange rate peg
according to preannounced rate of crawl.                                                 
04/1997 Monthly depreciation rate reduced from 1.2% to 1.1%  
08/1997 Further adjustment of the monthly depreciation rate to 1.0%
1/1998 Reduction of the monthly depreciation rate to 0.9%
01/1998 Imports and exports of domestic currency allowed up to Ft 350,000 per trip.
Latvia
02/1994 Informal pegging to SDRs at 0.7997 Latvian Lats to 1 SDRTime Changes
18
Lithuania
04/1994  Creation of a Currency Board with a fixed exchange rate of 1 Lithuanina Litas to 1
USD.
Poland
705/1991 Devaluation of the Zloty. The National Bank of Poland adjusts the official Zloty rate
by pegging it to a basket consisting of five currencies. 
10/1991 Introduction of crawling peg policy with depreciation by up to 1.8 % a month.
09-11/1994 Reduction of the monthly depreciation rate from 1.6% to 1.4%.
01/1995 Removing exchange restrictions on international transactions.
05/1995 External value of Zloty allowed to fluctuate within margins of 7% around the central
rate. 
01/1996 Reduction of crawl rate by 1% a month. 
Slovak Republic
02/1993 Introduction of the Slovak Koruna. The National Bank of Slovakia adjusts the official
koruna rate by pegging it to a basket consisting of five currencies.                          
01/1994 Annual limit on foreign exchange allowance for tourists increased to Sk 9,000's
equivalent. 
07/1994 Change of exchange rate pegging basket from five currencies DEM and USD (60:40). 
05-09/1995 Revaluation of the Koruna under bilateral payments agreement with the Czech Republic
by 4% (May) and 1% (September).                                                                            
        
09/1995 Termination of bilateral payments agreement with Czech Republic. 
10/1995 New Foreign Exchange Law: Koruna fully convertible for current international
transactions.
01-10/1995  Further increase to annual limit on foreign exchange allowance for tourists to 16,000 Sk
(January); 30,000 Sk (July), 60,000 Sk (October).                                              
07/1996 Exchange rate margins widened to +/- 5%.
12/1996 Limits on exporting and importing of national and foreign currency abolished and partly
replaced by declaration requirement.                                   
01/1997 Margins of exchange rate band widened to +/- 7%.Time Changes
19
Slovenia
06/1991 Introduction of Slovenian tolar.  Exchange rate determined through a managed float. 
07/1992 Foreign exchange transactions allowed.
02/1997 Cash withdrawals from foreign exchange accounts exceeding equivalent of SIT
250,000 per month are to be approved by BOS. 
Source: IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions Annual Report.                                     20
Table 3
Changes in External Capital Controls
Time Changes
Croatia
02/1996 New trade law allows domestic juridical persons to do foreign direct investments. 
03/1997 Foreign juridical persons allowed to withdraw monthly foreign currency equivalent up
to HRK 15,000 from deposit accounts.
Czech Republic
09/1994 Partial liberalization of foreign securities purchases by residents.
Simplification of rules to acquire properties abroad.
No longer import and export restrictions on securities denominated in Koruny.
08/1995 Curtailment of borrowing abroad by banks by limiting open positions of National Bank
towards nonresidents.                                 
Hungary
01/12/1991 Financial institutions‘ foreign borrowings to be approved by the NBH.                     
Credits to foreigners by Hungarian financial institutions limited to maturities up to 6
months; exceptional cases with NBH authorization.                      
Joint ventures generally without approval; exception: foreign participation of more than
10% of banks‘ & insurances‘ equities.                                   
Reglementation of joint ventures‘ taxation and further questions.                             
01/1991 Abolition of the licensing requirement for joint ventures.
01/1996 Elimination of capital account restrictions.                                      
Foreigners allowed to buy securities with maturities longer than 1 year without extra
NBH permission.                          
Permission of outward equity investments if equity share of over 10% is acquired
(canceled on March 20).                                                                
07/1996 Liberalization of issue, placement and introduction of OECD government bonds and
highly-rated OECD-based enterprises' bonds and shares.                                           
Extension of foreign exchange law's provisions on domestic securities to debt
instruments with maturities of 1 year and more.                                                 Time Changes
21
01/1997 Liberalization of issue and introduction of bonds with maturities of more than 1 year and
OECD-based  enterprises' investment grade-rated shares.                                    
Limitation of banks' short-term lending to non-residents to 50% of total foreign
exchange liabilities (from 50% of foreign exchange liabilities to foreigners).        
Liberalization of banks' futures and options transactions in foreign currencies.      
01/1997 No longer government approval for foreign participation in banks required.   
11/1997 Liberalization of short-term lending to non-residents.
01/1998 Liberalization of issue and introduction of shares, other securities, bonds and other debt
securities with a maturity of more then 1 year on domestic security market which are
denominated in foreign exchange and issued by OECD-based enterprises – irrespective
of credit rating.                                        
For residents: ability to purchase these securities without foreign exchange
authorization.   
01/1998 Elimination of restrictions on investments in branches of foreign companies (in addition
to investments in joint ventures and fully foreign-owned companies).         
Elimination of further, more specific criteria on these direct investments.               
Latvia
04/1996 Elimination of cabinet approval requirement for foreign direct investment above $ 1
million. 
Poland
07/1991 New foreign investment law
 – all restrictions on transfers of profits and capital repatriation cancelled.
01/1995 Removing exchange restrictions on international transactions. 
02/1997 Liberalizations on transfers of salaries, funds and deposits abroad by resident foreigners.
02/1997 Liberalization of capital transactions:                              
Limit for investment in publicly tradable securities issued in Poland by foreign entities
raised to ECU 300,000,00.                                                   
Residents allowed to purchase publicly traded securities in OECD countries ; purchases
above ECU 50,000 needing 3 months' notice to NBP.                                 
03/1997 Insurers permitted to purchase securities traded in OECD countries (minimum ratings
required).                           
Insurers allowed to invest abroad a maximum of 5% of funds covering their fund.  
Slovak Republic
12/1996 Limits on exporting and importing of national and foreign currency abolished and partly
replaced by declaration requirement.Time Changes
22
12/1996 Liberalization of financial credits with a maturity of 5 years and above provided by
Slovak residents to OECD residents.
Liberalization of receipt and provision of trade credits for OECD trade.
Liberalization of foreign borrowings by residents with a maturity of 3 years and above.
12/1996 Liberalization of direct investments in OECD countries.
Slovenia
04/1992 Ratios of foreign exchange deposits required to be held abroad by deposit money banks
as cover against domestically held foreign exchange deposits changed to 5-90%,
depending on deposits' maturity.                              
Permission to commercial banks to extend foreign exchange credits to resident juridical
persons.                             
02/1995 40% of external borrowing with maturities of less than 5 years not immediately used for
import financing to be deposited to a unremunerated Tolar bank account.          
07/1996 Extension of the maturity of loans borrowed abroad by residents subject to 40% interest-
free deposit requirements from 5 to 7 years.                                           
12/1996 Introduction of 10% interest-free deposit requirement on loans borrowed abroad by
residents with maturities of more than 7 years.                                                   
01/1997 Domestic banks permitted to extend credits to nonresidents. 
02/1997 Cash withdrawals from foreign exchange accounts exceeding equivalent of SIT 250,000
per month are to be approved by BOS.                                         
Nonresidents' portfolio investments in secondary market-traded securities and
derivatives
have to be performed through custody accounts at domestic banks.                            
05/1997 Remove of interest-free deposit requirement for loans raised abroad for setting up
company abroad, increaseing capital or purchasing foreign companies' shares.         
07/1997 Banks allowed to exempt from the balancing requirement the portfolio investments in
shares acquired by nonresidents who undertake for the next 7 years not to sell, assign
or dispose of securities to third parties – except to other nonresidents who undertake the
same commitment.  






a ) Ind. Prod. (%)
a Unemp. (%)









1990 6627.59  -7.58 -15.93 5.54
  279.57 1.27 NA
1991 5365.65   -10.63 -14.63 9.28
  156.12
  -4.19 NA
1992 5376.9   -1.72 -4.64 11.07 235.03
  -4.97 NA
1993 5486.2   1.05 0.95 12.55 243.12
  -2.86 NA
1994 5847.9   3.68 6.96 11.9 280.93 -2.87  4.98
1995 6256.5   5.59 7.11 11.67 345.79 -2.94 -8.09
1996 6717   4.73 5.12 10.87 416.2 -1.23 53.78
1997 6775.6
    5.32 8.1 10.13 363.52 -1.47 -1.99
Note: All figures, except for GDP per capita, are GDP weighted averages. GDP per capita is a population weighted average. The data are  taken from


























1990 44.0 43.0 2.1 7.8 411 81.1 15.44
  55.53 295
1991 40.9 47.3 -1.9 14.7 1747 84.9 12.38
  62.52 505
1992 48.3 52.8 2.5 11.0
d 2198.2 83.7 9.19 70.12 396
1993 54.3 62.4 -3.8 17.8 4037.6 88.9 7.62 67.18 767
1994 61.6 68.6 -0.2 25.3 2999.4 92.6 7.26 72.57 2763
1995 88.3 98.9 -0.436 50 9016.8 106 11.30 76.84 4213
1996 94.6 115.2 -11.9 54.1 7144.3 107.4 15.70 NA 9053
1997 103 127.1 -14.5 55.8 7675.5 106.9 19.50 NA 14168
Sources: Business Central Europe (BCE), online, Key Data 1990-97; IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, World Debt Tables; BIS,
Consolidated International Banking Statistics.2008
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